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Abstract 
Extending the line of research on stock-flow performance we examined the impact of personality 
characteristics on task performance. It was assumed that the need for cognition, the need for closure 
and the preference for intuition and deliberation would relate to individual variations in task 
performance differentiated into the dimensions heuristic reasoning, task effectiveness (number of 
correct answers) and task efficiency (time needed to perform the task). It was found that the need for 
closure did not relate to any of the task performance dimensions, while the preference for deliberation 
related positively with task effectiveness, and the need for cognition positively with task effectiveness 
and negatively with heuristic reasoning. Although all three constructs  possess a rather explicit 
temporal dimension, the examined needs and preferences appeared not te be correlated with the time 
needed to perform the stock-flow task. Further research is needed to elaborate on the precise relation 
between needs and preferences and stock-flow information processing as well as to refine the concept 
of task effectiveness. 
 
Introduction 
 People have difficulties performing stock-flow tasks (Booth Sweeney & Sterman, 2000; 
Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman, 2009; Korzilius, Raaijmakers, Rouwette, & Vennix, 2011; Pala & 
Vennix, 2005; Sterman, 2010). However, research is scarce on how individual’s characteristics of 
decision-making and judgment relate to stock-flow task performance. The current study focuses on 
three individual characteristics: need for closure, the motivation connected with decision making and 
judgment (Kruglanski, 1989; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), need for cognition, the extent to which a 
person enjoys and engages in effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984.), and 
individual strategy preference for intuition and deliberation (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). 
We explore the effect of the these three individual characteristics on task performance differentiated 
into heuristic reasoning (cf. Cronin et al.; Sterman), task effectiveness, and task efficiency. 
 
2 
Theoretical background  
Individual characteristics on decision-making and judgment 
 Research on stock-flow failure focuses on gaining insight in characteristics of and outcomes of 
the task performed, precursors of task performance are less often reported. Booth Sweeney and 
Sterman (2000) do not find any consistent patterns with regard to demographical effects (e.g. prior and 
current academic field, gender age, region). The participants’ prior knowledge of stock-flows (from 
playing the Beer game, exposing them to systems principles) appears to have no significant effect on 
the task performance either. In addition, Cronin et al. (2009) do not find clear effects of motivation 
and feedback presented to participants while performing tasks. Effects of precursors on task 
performance seem therefore rather indistinct. Remarkably, in this line of research there is much less 
focus on the relationship of individual’s characteristics with task performance. Especially, decision 
making and judgment characteristics of participants could be important. In this study we focus on the 
following constructs: the need for cognition, the need for closure, and the preference for intuition and 
deliberation. These constructs have very good psychometric qualities, measuring individual 
differences that have been shown to be related to decision-making and judgment (Betsch & Kunz, 
2008; Cacioppo et al., 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The need for cognition refers to “an 
individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors” (Cacioppo et al., 1984, p. 
306). The need for cognition theory assumes a peripheral and central route of information processing. 
The peripheral route stands for reliance on peripheral cues whereas in the central route the true merits 
of the information presented  are carefully and thoughtfully considered (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The 
need for closure refers to “a desire for definite knowledge on some issue” (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996, p. 263). It is described as an individual’s desire for a firm solution as opposed to enduring 
ambiguity. Kruglanski and Webster state that the motivation towards closure ”varies along a 
continuum anchored at one end with a strong need for closure and at the other end with a strong need 
to avoid closure” (Kruglanski & Webster, p. 264). The preference for intuition and deliberation 
resembles decision and judgment based on affect versus cognitions (cf. Betsch & Kunz, 2008, p. 536). 
In this construct, intuition is seen as part of the tacit, experiential system that is automatic, fast and 
associative. This system is contrasted with the deliberate, rational system in which thought is slow, 
deliberate and analytical (Epstein et al., 1996). The construct is connected with the concept of bounded 
rationality (Kahneman, 2003; cf. Simon, 1955; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) which means that 
decision making is not a completely deliberate reasoning process but also includes intuitive and 
affective components.  
To some extent, the three constructs share commonality. The need for cognition, the need for 
closure and the preference for intuition and deliberation, here understood as a heuristic versus 
systematic processing of information, all refer to conditions “under which people process information 
briefly and superficially and others wherein they do so thoroughly and methodologically” (Kruglanski 
& Webster, 1996, p. 268). In this context, the adverbs “superficially” versus “methodologically” refer 
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to the content of the construct, the adverbs “briefly”  and “superficially” to its temporal dimension. As 
a consequence, the three constructs relate conceptually to the dependent variables task effectiveness 
(content dimension) as well as to task efficiency (time dimension).  
An apparent difference between the need for closure and the alternative constructs is the fact 
that the need for closure theory “does not postulate two qualitatively different modes of information 
processing” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, p. 268). Rather, the inherent difference between brief and 
thorough processing is seen as “a matter of extent”. The need for closure and the need for cognition 
also differ with respect to the goal people try to accomplish. . For cognitive closure the goal is the 
desired end state ‘to have definite knowledge’, while for need for cognition the goal is the process of 
thinking as such. In line with these differences, the need for closure is generally weakly, and 
negatively correlated to the need for cognition (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  As far as we know, the  
relation between the preference for intuition and deliberation and the other two constructs has not been 
subject of research. 
 
Task performance: task effectiveness, task efficiency, and heuristics 
In research on stock-flow performance using the department store or comparable tasks 
(Brunstein, Gonzalez, & Kanter, 2010; Cronin et al., 2009, Korzilius et al., 2011; Sterman, 2010) the 
dependent variable is the number of correct answers. This can be considered as a measure of task 
effectiveness: the degree to which the participant is able to correctly solve the problem. However, this 
aspect of task performance does not take into account the time it takes to solve the problem. The time 
needed to perform the task can be regarded as a measure of task efficiency. Although the time needed 
may be correlated to the number of correct answers, in this exploratory study, we focus on the effect of 
the individual characteristics on both variables separately. 
We also explore the influence of individual characteristics on the use of heuristics. When 
facing complex problems or incomplete information, people often draw on heuristic reasoning, 
replacing the original question by a related question that is easier to answer (Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the literature it was assumed 
that in stock-flow tasks, people often use what is called the correlation heuristic, a form of pattern 
matching in which people think that the stock resembles the (net)flow (Booth Sweeney & Sterman, 
2000; Cronin et al., 2009; Sterman, 2010). By using the so-called think aloud method in the 
department store task,  Korzilius et al. (2011) were able to corroborate the correlation heuristic: 
participants actually did verbalize their thoughts in terms of the biggest difference between inflow and 
outflow at a particular point in time, thus expressing the correlation heuristic in words. In general it is 
to be expected that the use of heuristics is influenced, not only by the complexity of the task presented, 
but also by personal predispositions, in the form of individual characteristics. In the literature on the 
need for cognition, need for closure, and the preference for intuition and deliberation, the constructs 
are in varying degree explicitly linked with forms of heuristic reasoning (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; 
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Cacioppo et al., 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). To enable the exploration of this relationship in 
this study, we assessed the presence of heuristic reasoning.. 
Summarizing, in this study we explore the effect of the individual characteristics on decision-
making and judgment: need for cognition, need for closure, and preference for intuition and 
deliberation on stock-flow task performance, in terms of task effectiveness, task efficiency, and use of 
heuristics (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model: effect of individual characteristics on stock-flow task performance 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 115 second year bachelor students of Business Administration of Radboud 
University Nijmegen in the Netherlands, following a Management game course. Students were told 
that as part of the course a short exercise on decision making had to be performed. Participation was 
compulsory and a reward was given to the best scoring participants. There were 53 (46%) female and 
62 (54%) male participants. Their mean age was 20.6 (range 19-27, SD = 1.41). Three quarters of the 
students (n = 87, 76%) had as prior high school profile Economics and Society, the majority (n = 111, 
97%) had the Dutch nationality, and 4 students (3%) had played the Beer game before. The 
participants filled out a questionnaire and subsequently performed a stock-flow task. 
 
Procedure and materials questionnaire 
 The questionnaire was filled out by the participants during the first lecture of the course after 
some introductory remarks. It took about 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
 
 All participants completed a questionnaire consisting of a number of background variables 
(e.g. age, gender, prior high school profile) and three 7-point Likert scales with answers ranging from 
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“very strongly disagree” to “very strongly agree”. Some items were negatively formulated to avoid 
response set. 
  Need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1984) is the extent to which people enjoy thinking and 
learning. The need for cognition consists of 18 items, example item “I would prefer complex to simple 
problems”. 
 Need for closure is the desire for clear, definite, or unambiguous knowledge that will guide 
perception and action (Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2005). Need for closure consists of 25 items divided 
over five subscales: Need for structure (5 items), example item: “I find that a well-ordered life with 
regular hours suits my temperament”; Need for predictability (5 items), example item: “I don’t like 
situations that are uncertain”; Need for decisiveness (5 items), example item: “When I go shopping, I 
have difficulty deciding exactly what it is that I want”; Intolerance for ambiguity (5 items), example 
item: “I dislike it when a person’s statement is unclear to me”; Closed-mindedness (5 items), example 
item: “Even after I’ve made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a different 
opinion”. 
 Preference for intuition and deliberation consists of 18 items equally split over two 
independent subscales: Preference for intuition (9 items), is an individual’s preference for intuition as 
decision making that uses affect as a decision criterion, example item: “I listen carefully to my deepest 
feelings“. The preference for deliberation (9 items) is decision making using explicit evaluations, 
beliefs, and reasons, example item: “Before making decisions, I first think them through”. 
Internal consistency in terms of Cronbach’s alpha of the scales was acceptable (i.e. higher than 
.60; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 92; see Table 1) except for the need for closure 
subscales: Need for decisiveness ( = .59) and closed-mindedness ( = .39). These two subscales were 
not used in the research. After recoding negatively formulated items, mean composite scales were 
calculated for all scales. For all scales, high scores indicate that participants possessed the 
characteristic to a greater extent. 
 
Procedure stock-flow task 
In line with existing research (e.g. Cronin et al., 2009; Pala & Vennix, 2005) an English 
version of the department store task was used. In addition, to examine whether there were task context 
effects, we developed an alternative stock-flow task we refer to as the bank task. For the Business 
administration students in the sample we deemed inflows and outflows of a bank more salient and 
familiar than the flows of people into and out of a store (see Cronin et al., p. 121). We closely 
followed the format of the department store task regarding the lay-out, number of words, and the 
wording of the four questions. 
 The participants arrived in teams at the experimentation rooms. All members of one team 
performed the same task, 53% (n = 61) the department store task, and 47% (n = 54) the bank task. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the verbal (think aloud) (43%, n = 50) or the written 
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condition (57%, n = 65). From each team two or three members performed the think aloud protocol on 
an individual basis. The participants in the written condition did the task in one room at detached seats 
under surveillance of an assistant. They were told that they had to do the task individually and were 
thus not allowed to talk to each other. The other instructions were the same as in the think aloud 
condition. Contrary to the think aloud condition, this condition was not videotaped. Both tasks were 
pre-tested by two university lecturers and two Master students. The data were collected in 2010. 
 
Materials and measures stock-flow task 
We transcribed the video tapes of the think aloud protocols and focused on the reasoning used 
for answering question 3 and 4 (Q3 and Q4). A qualitative, iterative approach was followed: in the 
search for key phrases the first author moved back and forth between the transcriptions, coming up 
with a preliminary categorization of reasoning strategies. Next, the third author independently coded 
the 44 protocols (due to technical shortcomings six of the fifty recordings could not be used) so that 
the interrater reliability could be assessed. Regarding the allocation of the participants there was 83% 
agreement about the reasoning strategies (reasoning types) used for Q3 and Q4, Cohen’s kappa was 
.73. Any differences were subsequently settled by consent. The final classification was used to 
operationalize the heuristic reasoning concept, variable Heuristic. Heuristic has three categories based 
on the reasoning in both Q3 and Q4: a non-heuristic mode of reasoning (value = 0), a heuristic mode 
of reasoning
1
 (value = 1), or a combination, a heuristic as well as a non-heuristic mode of reasoning 
(value = 0.5).  
We also established if the answers of the four questions were correct or incorrect. In line with 
previous research (e.g. Cronin et al., 2009) we considered answers to all questions correct if they were 
within 1 minute of the correct response. In addition, we assessed the total Number of correct answers 
(theoretical range 0-4; see Table 1). As it appeared in previous research (Korzilius et al., 2011) that 
there were no task context effects and no difference between the verbal and written condition we 
pooled the data. 
The video tapes were also used to determine the time needed by the participants to come up 
with the answers on question three and four (Q3 and Q4), using the beginning of the task as the 
starting point for measurement (variable Time in seconds).  
 
Statistical analyses 
IBM SPSS Statistics (Version 19) was used to conduct the statistical analyses. We calculated 
descriptive statistics and Pearson and Spearman correlations to describe the variables and to study 
interrelationships. To control whether the assumption of normality was met, one-sample Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests were conducted. Also, assumptions of multicollinearity and homoscedasticity were 
                                                     
1
 Heuristic reasoning considers either inflow or outflow, or inflow-outflow differences (net flow) at a specific 
point in time. 
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tested. We conducted linear regression analyses to test the effects on the metric dependent variables 
and (multinomial) logistic regression for the ordinal and dichotomous dependent variables. 
 
Results 
Frequency distributions of the independent variables showed that the mean scores of the participants 
were relatively high on preference for deliberation and need for cognition (see Table 1). All 
independent variables were normally distributed (Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests, ps > .05). 
Regarding the stock-flow task it appeared that out of 44 participants 12 used a non-heuristic mode of 
reasoning, 5 used a combination of non-heuristic and heuristic reasoning, and 27 used heuristic 
reasoning. Mean time needed to complete Q3 and Q4 was 5 minutes and 17 seconds. Mean Number of 
correct answers was just above 2. Time in seconds was normally distributed, Number of correct 
answers was not (Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests Z = 0.63, p = .82; Z = 4.42, p < .001, respectively). 
 
 
Table 1. Reliability figures of scales and descriptives statistics of measures 
Measure  Cronbach’ s alpha n M  SD  
Need for cognition  .83 112 4.68  0.60  
Need for structure .80 112 4.27 1.14 
Need for predictability .77 112 3.86 0.97 
Intolerance for ambiguity .64 112 4.61 0.74 
Preference for deliberation  .78 112 5.05  0.69  
Preference for intuition  .81 112 4.53  0.76  
Heuristics 
a
 - 44 0.67 0.44 
Number of correct answers  - 115 2.23  0.80  
Time in seconds  - 31 317  139  
Note. 
a 
Ordinal variable with values 0, 0.5, and 1 (see text); Mdn = 1. 
 
Bivariate intercorrelations (see Table 2) showed that higher Need for cognition was related to higher 
Number of correct answers and the use of a non-heuristic mode of reasoning, respectively. Preference 
for deliberation was also positively correlated to Number of correct answers. A non-heuristic mode of 
reasoning was associated with more correct answers. Time in seconds appeared not to be correlated to 
any other variable. There also were a number of significant intercorrelations between the independent 
variables. 
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Table 2. Intercorrelations between measures 
 
Heuristic
a
 
Number 
of 
correct 
answers 
Time in 
seconds
b
 
Need for 
cognition 
Need for 
structure 
Need for 
predictability 
Intolerance 
for 
ambiguity 
Preference 
for 
deliberation 
Number of correct answers  -.60**         
Time in seconds .06  -.04        
Need for cognition  -.37*  .27**  -.13       
Need for structure  .12  .04  .16  -.06      
Need for predictability  .02  -.07  -.14  -.29**  .43**     
Intolerance for ambiguity  -.09  .02  .02  -.08  .28**  .47**    
Preference for deliberation  -.19  .24*  -.02  .33**  .50**  .28**  .22*   
Preference for intuition  .20  -.09  .06  -.00  -.17  -.26**  -.06  -.15  
Note. N = 112, 
a
 n = 44 
b
 n = 31. Correlations are Pearson correlations, except for correlations with the ordinal variable Heuristic, with values 0, 0.5, and 1, 
which are Spearman´s correlations. *p < .05; **p < .01 (2-tailed) 
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Multivariate testing of the effects on the three dependent variables yielded the following. First, a 
multinomial logistic regression model with Heuristic as dependent variable was not significant (2(12, 
n = 44) = 15.86, p = .20). However, the Need for cognition was a significant predictor (2(2, n = 44) = 
9.20, p = < .05; R
2
 Nagelkerke = .20). A follow-up analysis with only Need for cognition as 
independent variable was significant (2(2, n = 44) = 7.86, p < .05). It appeared that for each unit 
increase in Need for cognition, the odds of belonging to the category non-heuristic mode of reasoning 
relative to a heuristic mode of reasoning would be expected to increase by a factor of 4.61. For the 
category combination, the odds ratio was 8.34. Second, as the dependent variable Number of correct 
answers was not normally distributed, we conducted a logistic regression with a dichotomous 
operationalization (2 or fewer correct answers vs. 3 or 4 correct answers). This showed a statistically 
significant model (2(6, n = 112) = 16.07, p  < .05; R2 Nagelkerke = .21), with Preference for 
deliberation as significant predictor (b = 1.04, p < .05, odds ratio = 2.82). This means that for each 
unit increase in Preference for deliberation, with all other variables held constant, the odds for giving a 
higher number of correct answers in the stock-flow task would be expected to increase by a factor of 
2.82. Third, and finally, the regression model with Time in seconds as dependent variable was not 
significant (F < 1). 
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
In this study a relationship was expected between individual’s characteristics of decision-making and 
judgment and stock-flow task performance. More precisely, it was assumed that the constructs the 
need for cognition, the need for closure and the preference for intuition and deliberation, would affect 
stock-flow task performance differentiated into heuristic reasoning, task effectiveness (number of 
correct answers) and task efficiency (time needed for task). This assumption was based on the 
observation that all three constructs refer to conditions under which people process information briefly 
and superficially and others wherein they do so thoroughly and methodologically (cf. Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996). The constructs therefore refer conceptually not only to the content of information 
processing but also to the time dimension of this process. Remarkably, only the content dimension was 
evidenced by the data. That is, participants high in need for cognition are less often involved in 
heuristic reasoning than those low in this need. The preference for deliberation appeared the predictor 
of the number of correct answers. Conversely, the sub scales of the need for closure did not affect task 
effectiveness. Participants low in the need for closure were not more successful in analyzing the 
information of the store/bank task than those high in the need for closure. The fact that Webster and 
Kruglanski (1994) observed that the empirical correlation between the two constructs, the need for 
cognition and the need for closure, was rather low, may play a part of the explanation, but has 
nevertheless been further elaborated upon in relation to stock-flow information processing. 
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Further elaboration is also needed with regard to one of the dependent variables, the time needed to 
solve the task. The concept of time efficiency showed no correlation with any of the constructs or 
subscales examined, despite the fact that the three constructs all possess a rather explicit temporal 
dimension. Especially the construct need for closure is inherently temporal. However, in this 
exploratory study, needs and preferences are not converted in a corresponding use of time. Of course, 
the character and the modest scope of our research in terms of sample size does not allow for far-
reaching conclusions. Besides, at a conceptual level, one has also to take into consideration the 
relatively gross character of the time efficiency variable. This variable measures not only the time used 
to answer question three and four, but includes also the time used for the first two questions. Refining 
this variable, for example by distinguishing between the time needed to answer questions one and two 
on the one hand, and the time consumed while performing the second part of the task on the other 
hand, might enhance future research and lead to more precise results. 
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